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Abstract
We introduce a new data set on hiring and firing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the
period 1984-90. The data are based on surveys of business people in the countries covered,
so the indices we use are subjective in nature. Controlling for country and time fixed effects,
and using dynamic panel data techniques, we find evidence that increasing the flexibility of
the labor market increases both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor
force. A conservative estimate suggests that if France were to make its labor markets as
flexible as those in the US, its employment rate would increase 1.6 percentage points, or 14%
of the employment gap between the two countries. The estimated effects are larger in the
female than in the male labor market, although both groups seem to have similar long run
coefficients. There is also some evidence that more flexibility leads to lower unemployment
rates and to lower rates of long-term unemployment. The analysis of inflows and vacancies
present some inconsistencies, although there is some evidence that the correlation between
inflows and the business cycle is stronger in more flexible labor markets (again this is stronger
for females). We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inflexible labor
markets produce “jobless recoveries” and introduce more unemployment persistence.
JEL Classification: J65
Keywords: Job security provisions, subjective data, employment, and unemployment.
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I.  Introduction
One of the biggest challenges in economics today is to explain what causes European
unemployment. Commentators on the European situation often blame poorly designed labor market
institutions, a view that sometimes goes by the ugly name of “Eurosclerosis”. Economists advising
governments on these issues share more or less the same diagnostic: regulations such as hiring and firing
restrictions faced by firms, as well as the generous welfare state that protects the unemployed, are behind
the differential labor market performances of Europe and America. A number of countries have taken this
view seriously. Great Britain and France are just two examples of countries that followed the economist’s
advice and reduced hiring and firing restrictions in the mid 1980’s to combat high unemployment. This view
of the labour market has also inspired large reform programs in the less developed world, where
unemployment has recently increased. In fact, deregulation of the labor market is part of what the
Washington Consensus often calls “second generation reforms”.
2
Since unemployment brings real misery to people’s lives, and job security provisions often
involve delicate redistribution issues between richer firm owners and poorer workers, one would think
that economists giving such advice know what they are doing. More precisely, one would think that
there are hundreds of papers studying whether more flexibility in fact does reduce a country’s
unemployment rate in practice. Sadly, this is not the case. To our knowledge, there is one panel
study on the effects of labor market flexibility (Lazear (1990)). And only a couple of cross-country
studies, like the early one of Bertola (1990) based on evidence for 10 countries or that in the OECD
Jobs Study (1994) based on 21 observations. Gregg and Manning (1997) review some of the available
evidence on the effects of labor market flexibility and argue that it is “much less persuasive than is
commonly believed”, and that the profession’s “faith in the merits of labor market de-regulation is misplaced”
(p.395). There is, perhaps, no experience more sobering to an economist than to review the state-of-the-art
evidence on the effects of firing costs and to reflect on the social costs of unemployment.
The contribution of this paper is empirical. We introduce a new data set on hiring and firing
restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the 7-year period covering 1984-90. The data are based on surveys
of business people in the countries covered, so the indices we use are subjective in nature. We also use
the new summary measure of the parameters of the unemployment insurance system compiled by the
OECD in 1994, which constitutes a significant improvement on previous benefit data. We then present an
empirical analysis of the effect of flexibility on a number of labor market variables that follows and extends
the contributions of Lazear (1990). Controlling for country and time fixed effects, and using dynamic panel
data techniques developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), we find evidence that relaxing job security
provisions increases the employment rate and the participation rate. The estimated effects seem large.
The fixed effects estimate tells us that, if France were to reform its labor markets and make them as
flexible as the American, its employment rate would increase by 1.6 percentage points.
3 This is equivalent
to 14% of the employment rate gap between the two countries. In order to express this effect in terms of
                                                  
2 Labor flexibility is one of the main features of the IMF’s recent agreement with Argentina, where
unemployment reached an alarming 18.6% after the first 5 years of pro-market reforms.
3 France is the median country in terms of flexibility. See Table A for a full description of the data.3
GDP per capita, we note that it implies an increase in total employment of 2.8%. In the short run, the
estimated effects are stronger for females than for males, although interestingly both groups have roughly
similar long run coefficients. There is also evidence that a more flexible labor market leads to lower
unemployment rates and to a lower proportion of long term unemployed in the unemployment pool. There
is weaker evidence that flexibility leads to longer hours worked in manufacturing. The effect of
unemployment benefits on these variables is less clear cut. We also document the basic correlation of
flexibility with inflows and the rate of unfilled vacancies, and review the hypotheses that inflexible labor
markets produce “jobless recoveries”, introduce more unemployment persistence and reduce the country’s
vulnerability to external shocks.
The main empirical evidence on the effect of labor market flexibility that we have available today
is presented in Lazear (1990). He uses data on severance pay and periods of notice required before
employment termination for 22 developed countries for the period 1956 to 1984, and finds some evidence
that they have a negative relationship with the employment rate and a positive one with the unemployment
rate. For example, Lazear finds that the amount of money paid to the worker as severance enters
negatively and significantly in univariate regressions on country means (18 observations) explaining the
employment rate, the participation rate and the number of hours worked per week. The coefficient on
severance pay in the unemployment regression is positive but insignificant, however. In univariate
regressions explaining the unemployment rate and the number of hours worked that include country
dummies (468 observations), the coefficient on severance pay keeps the sign and turns significant. It is
insignificant, however, when explaining the employment rate or the rate of labor force participation (where
it also changes sign).
Lazear points out a number of limitations in these data. Amongst them is the fact that information
on one type of worker (blue collar with ten years of service) is used as a proxy for the entire system.
Second and more significantly, information on two types of institutions (amount of severance pay and
months of advance notice before dismissal) are used to proxy for a large number of employment
regulations that affect the flexibility of the labor market.
4 Clearly, flexibility of the labor market could be
affected without showing up in these two series. Third, it does not allow for the fact that countries differ in
the degree of enforcement of these laws, and that other, perhaps informal, aspects maybe more important
than the written laws. Lastly, Lazear points out that “for the most part, rules change once or twice during the
period per country, so much of the mileage is cross-sectional rather than time-series” (Lazear (1990)
p.708). Yet, it is the best data that economists have available to study a most important set of issues.
The flexibility data used in this paper come from the World Competitiveness Report (WCR). The
WCR requests the opinion of a number of top and middle managers (on average 1,531 each year) on the
flexibility enterprises have to adjust things like compensation and employment levels to economic realities
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in each of the countries covered. By its nature, these data avoid some of the objections raised to the data
used by Lazear. For example, it uses information provided by business people who, presumably, are in a
position to judge what aspects of flexibility laws actually affect business conditions. Furthermore, it passes
simple validation tests. For example, it correlates nicely with the index of “strictness of employment
protection legislation” constructed for the OECD Jobs Study (1994), arguably the most complete measure
available, for the one year where both types of data are available (1989). There are, of course, limitations
to the data we use. The time series dimension of the panel is considerably shorter than that of Lazear’s (7
years versus 29). Importantly, the question asked is more vague than what ideally an economist would like
to use. Furthermore, a lower set of answers in one country may simply reflect the fact that people there use
a different cardinal ranking than people in other countries. Though some of these objections can be tackled
in the empirical section, the fact remains that subjective responses should be treated with caution.
However, we believe the topic to be of such economic and social significance, and the data that so far has
been available to the profession to be of such poor quality, that a willingness to experiment with survey
data is justified.
5
On the theoretical side, Lazear (1990) points out that if markets are complete, mandated
severance payments should not have real effects. The argument is that the firm-worker pair can undo the
firing costs imposed on them by a reverse transfer from the worker to the firm at the onset of the
employment contract. Bertola (1990) finds that job security legislation does not bias labour demand toward
lower average employment at given wages in a simple dynamic economy. The intuition is that a firm
subject to a positive shock will hire less workers than otherwise, but that firms subject to a negative shock
will be less prone to firing. Thus employment fluctuations are dampened, but average employment may be
unchanged. The evidence he presents is based on Emerson (1988) and is consistent with this view.
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) present a model where firing costs actually increase long run employment. On
the other hand, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) study a general equilibrium model with entry and exit of
firms and calibrate it using data on firm level dynamics. They show that a tax on job destruction equal to
one year’s wage reduces the employment rate by roughly 2.5%. There are very large welfare costs in their
model: the cost of the same tax in terms of consumption is over 2%. A recent paper by Alvarez and
Veracierto (1998) extends Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) by introducing frictions in a world without
perfect insurance markets. They find that severance payments increase welfare. The reduction in firm
layoffs and the increase in the agents’ search efforts (because employment is more desirable) reduce
unemployment enough to compensate for lower consumption levels (productivity also falls).
A recent paper by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) shows that we can have similar rates of job
creation and destruction across countries despite there being very different degrees of labor market
flexibility, if other institutions lead to wage compression. Thus, lower flows due to job security provisions,
the argument goes, could be compensated by higher employer-initiated job turnover originating in the
generosity of the European welfare state. Thus, the paper points to the importance of controlling for the
generosity of the welfare state when investigating the effects of flexibility on the workings of the labor
markets. All regressions in our paper include the new summary measure of the unemployment benefit
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system compiled by the OECD Jobs Study (1994). It is calculated as the pre-tax average of the
replacement ratios for two earnings level, three family situations and three durations of unemployment.
Although not perfect, the data begin to address some of the criticisms raised by Atkinson and Micklewright
(1991) to the data previously used in the literature.
6
In section II we present the data while section III presents the empirical results. Section IV
concludes.
II.  Empirical Strategy and Data Description
II.a. Empirical Strategy
In order to study the effect of hiring and firing restrictions on the performance of the labor market,
we estimate regressions of the form
VAR Flexibility Benefit it it it i t it = + + + + + a a a m n e 1 2 3 (1)
where VAR represents the variables of interest. For purposes of comparison with Lazear’s results, in the
main tables these are the employment rate, the rate of participation in the labor force, the average number
of hours worked in manufacturing and the unemployment rate. We also study the effect of flexibility on the
proportion of long term unemployed in the unemployment pool, the vacancy rate and the inflow rate.
Variables are defined in Appendix 1.
The estimation strategy we use follows Lazear’s approach of using a parsimonious reduced form
specification. We also show the results of different specifications, rather than committing to one early on.
The main differences with Lazear’s estimation strategy are that: (1) we do not impose the restriction of a
quadratic time trend but report regressions controlling for year fixed effects (i.e. we include year dummies
instead of the time trend and the time trend squared used by Lazear); (2) we control in all our regressions
for the generosity of the welfare state (as proxied by unemployment benefits); and (3) we report
regressions where lagged variables are included since firing costs are sometimes expected to affect the
flows (but not directly the stocks) in the labor market.
II.b. Construction of the Data Set
The indicator of labour market flexibility used in this paper comes from the World Competitiveness
Report (WCR), a publication of the EMF foundation in Geneva. It covers 21 countries (a list is given in
Appendix 1) and covers the period 1984-90. Thus, the first year for which we have data is also the last year
covered by the Lazear study. The WCR was used before by economists studying investment and growth
(De Long and Summers (1991)) and studying corruption and competition (Ades and Di Tella (1994)), but its
use as a source of labor market flexibility data is new. It consists of yearly surveys conducted amongst
chief executive officers and economic leaders in the countries covered, who are mailed a questionnaire
                                                                                                                                                 
view this paper as complementing Lazear’s approach with “hard” data.
6 A number of studies have found evidence that unemployment benefit generosity increases unemployment at the
micro level (e.g. Katz and Meyer (1990)). Cross-country panel studies, on the other hand, have failed to uncover
significant effects of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate, once country and year fixed effects have been
included. One of the potential reasons is that the benefit data used are very poor. For example, Layard et al (1990)
uses the 1985 duration of unemployment benefits as an indicator of generosity for the whole sample.6
containing a large number of questions on their country’s competitiveness (unfortunately sometimes it can
contain as many as 90 questions). The number of returned questionnaires varies every year: 1,100 in
1984, 1,598 in 1985, 1,369 in 1986, 1,937 in 1988, 1,800 in 1989, and 1,384 in 1990.
7 There was no WCR
containing 1987 data so the 1986 and 1988 observations were interpolated to obtain observations for 1987.
The survey question that is used (classified as 2.17 LABOUR-COST FLEXIBILITY in 1984) asked the
respondents: "Flexibility of enterprises to adjust job security and compensation standards to economic
realities: 0=none at all, to 100=a great deal". This question was changed in 1990 to "Flexibility of
management to adjust employment levels during difficult periods: 0=low, to 100=high". It was dropped
altogether in subsequent years.
First, note that the size of the surveys implies that the variance of the observations would be
considerably lower than would be the case with, for example, individual level data.
8 Second, it is worth
emphasising that with survey data it is feasible to capture the many dimensions that the types of
institutional arrangements associated with employment protection laws encompass. For example, much of
the impact of hiring and firing costs comes from the degree of enforcement of the different aspects of the
law, such as whether or not there is rightful dismissal, or the appropriate wage/length of employment over
which to calculate severance pay. It is easier to capture this information through survey questions
registering opinions than with easy to quantify data describing the actual laws, unless it is done in a very
meticulous manner. Another important advantage is that the respondents have actual experience and
knowledge of the workings of the labour market in question, so presumably they know the relevance, if
any, of changes in the written laws.
Cross Section Validation: As with all subjective data, it is important to see if some of the survey information
being used can be related to hard data. The WCR survey measure of labor market flexibility can be
compared with other measures that are available for a limited cross section of countries. For example, the
OECD Jobs Study (1994) has produced a cross-country index of the "strictness" of labour employment
protection legislation for 1989. The OECD index is based on an overall assessment of the extent of regular
procedural inconveniences faced by employers such as delays to the start of notice of dismissal, the
amount of notice and severance pay for no-fault dismissals, and also the difficulty of dismissal. The
difficulty of dismissal includes assessments of the definition of unfair dismissal, trial periods and
reinstatements.
9 The correlation coefficient of the WCR survey measure of labour market flexibility in 1989
                                                  
7 For 1989 the WCR just says, “over 1,800” questionnaires were returned. It only reports the number of questionnaires
sent out for 1984 (5,500 sent out, for a response rate of over 20%) and 1985 (7,513 sent out for a response rate of
21%). We do not know response rates for later years, except for the 1993 WCR (2,160 returned out of 10,300 sent
out), although this issue did not contain the flexibility question.
8 There were more countries covered in the questionnaire than the ones used in this study (because data on
other variables of interest is lacking). For example, the 1985 data comes from 1,598 answers from 31
countries, so the average is 52. This may underestimate the average number of respondents for the countries
we study in this paper as they are all OECD countries, and it is likely that more questionnaires were sent and
returned to these countries than to other countries in the survey (like Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea,
etc).
9 The Jobs Study notes researchers have constructed various summary indicators to describe the strictness of
employment protection in each country but that "given the complexity of the phenomenon, summary indicators are
inevitably somewhat arbitrary" (page 70). Norway and Sweden have relatively high rankings on the OECD scale of
strictness of employment protection. This is due to, for example, the legislative provisions allowing courts to order the7
(where high values denote high flexibility) with the 1989 OECD indicator (where high values denote greater
strictness) is -0.754. Higher levels of flexibility measured by the WCR survey responses are strongly
associated with lower levels of employment protection strictness measured by the OECD quantification of
legal data, as we can reject the hypothesis of independence of the two variables. These two measures are
plotted in Figure 1 in Appendix 2.
A second measure of the strictness of employment protection has been produced by the
International Organisation of Employers (IOE) (1988). They assessed the importance of obstacles to
termination or use of regular and fixed-term contracts on a 0-3 scale across countries in 1985. Regulatory
constraints were classified as insignificant (0), minor, serious or fundamental (3). The correlation coefficient
of the WCR survey measure of labour market flexibility in 1985 with the 1985 IOE indicator is -0.586.
Higher levels of flexibility measured by the WCR survey responses are associated with lower levels of
employment protection strictness measured by the IOE, although the correlation is not as strong as before
(independence can again be comfortably rejected). These two measures are plotted in Figure 2 in
Appendix 2. Lastly, we also correlate the WCR data to the index used by Bertola (1990) based on
information presented in Emerson (1988), and extended in the OECD Jobs Study (1994) to cover 21
countries. The correlation coefficient is -0.578 and we can reject the null of zero correlation. The data are
plotted in Figure 3 in Appendix 2.
Time Series Validation: Recently, Saint-Paul (1996) has coded a number of selected events of changes in
job protection legislation that have occurred in Europe over the last 25 years. He classifies each event
according to weather job protection legislation has become more or less restrictive. There are 12 events
that have occurred in dates and countries for which we also have WCR data. For 9 of the 12 events, Saint-
Paul records an event with the same sign as our data would predict (we create a new variable
DFlexibilityt=Flexibilityt-Flexibilityt-1). Thus, for three events our data disagrees with Saint Paul’s
classification. These are: the United Kingdom in 1990 (when there was an increase in the employment
duration required to benefit from unfair dismissal protection), Italy in 1987 (when there was a liberalisation
of determined duration contracts) and Italy in 1990 when there was an extension of unfair dismissal
legislation to smaller firms. In the last two events in Italy, however, the variable DFlexibility registers only
very small values (5.9% and 5.8% of a standard deviation in the DFlexibility variable).
A further concern with the WCR flexibility indicator is that, being assessments of businesspersons,
they may be affected by how well firms are doing. Maybe when a country is in a recession managers will
become aware that it is tough to adjust employment levels whereas in a booming economy managers do
not recall these difficulties. Or maybe managers are just more positive all round in economic booms. We
test the hypothesis that the WCR flexibility variable is correlated with a number of indicators of the
business cycle and do not find evidence of such a correlation in any of them. For example, we study the
correlation between flexibility and a measure of aggregate GDP (at constant 1985 prices). Pearson’s
correlation coefficient is negative and insignificant (so is Spearman’s rho) so we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. Controlling for time and fixed effects, the estimated
                                                                                                                                                 
reinstatement of unfairly dismissed employees in Norway and the 6-month trial period in Sweden which must be given
to dismiss a 35 year old worker.8
effect of aggregate GDP on flexibility is positive and insignificant (it is significant at the 79% level). Still, the
empirical section will present regression estimates where flexibility appears lagged one year, so the
possibility of joint determination of flexibility with economic variables is reduced.
As a measure of the level of unemployment benefits in a country, we use the recently published
OECD summary measure of the parameters of the unemployment insurance system (OECD Jobs Study
(1994)). It is calculated as the pre-tax average of the replacement ratios for two earnings levels (average
earnings and two thirds average earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse and with
spouse in work) and three durations of unemployment (first year, second and third year, and fourth and fifth
year).
10 It is not weighted by the composition of unemployment in any particular place or period. This data
represents a significant improvement over previous measures used. Consider the case of an unmarried
worker in Norway. The worker's unemployment benefit replacement rate would be 62% in the first year,
41% in the second and third years and 14% in the fourth and fifth years. These numbers don't vary
according to family circumstance. The comparable numbers for the USA would be 24%, 5% and 5%,
respectively, but would increase to 26% in the first year if the worker had a dependent spouse and fall to
21% if the worker had a spouse that worked. In the second, third, fourth and fifth years unemployment
benefits would be zero if the worker had a spouse that worked and 10% if the spouse was dependent.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) have emphasised that this is a desirable feature of benefit data since
cuts in one type of benefit are often offset by a corresponding increase in another type. Due to the
complexity of the OECD calculations of benefit generosity, measurements were made at two-yearly
intervals. Consequently observations were interpolated to obtain data for consecutive years.
We completed our data set with the employment rate (defined as total civilian employment divided
by the population aged between 15 and 64 years old), the participation rate (defined as total civilian
employment plus total unemployment divided by the population aged between 15 and 64) and the average
number of weekly hours worked in the manufacturing sector. We also collected the unemployment rate,
the rate of unfilled vacancies and the rate of long term unemployment (defined as the number of workers
who have been out of work for 6 months or more as a percentage of total unemployment). The source of
this data is the Centre for Economic Performance OECD 1950-88 data set compiled by Bagliano et al
(1992) and updated by Brian Bell (see Appendix 1 for all data definitions). Pascal Marianna at the OECD
kindly provided us with the latest updated file of inflow data (the number of unemployed persons with
duration less than one month divided by total employment).
Data definitions appear in Appendix 1, while summary features of the data are described in Table
A in Appendix 1. The raw data show that countries with more flexible labour markets have higher
employment rates, lower unemployment rates and lower proportions of long-term unemployed, though the
relationships are by no means monotonic. The raw data are graphed in Appendix 2.
III.   Empirical Results
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III. a. Basic Evidence on Labor Market Flexibility
We begin our empirical analysis by studying the effect of labor market flexibility on the
employment rate. In Figure 4, in Appendix 2, we graph the raw flexibility and employment data. Regression
(1) in Table IA estimates the effect of Flexibility and Benefits on the employment rate using Generalised
Least Squares random effects (Balestra-Nerlove). For purposes of comparison, Table VI on page 716 in
Lazear (1990) presents hypothesis tests where the lack of independence over time of the error term in a
given country has been taken into account. Regression (1) in Table IA shows that countries with more
flexible labour markets also have higher employment rates. The effect of unemployment benefits is
negative but insignificant. The estimated flexibility effect is large. If the estimated effects are taken to be
causal, a one standard deviation increase in the flexibility of the labor market will bring about an increase in
the employment rate of 1.9%, almost 20% of a standard deviation in the Employment variable. In other
words, if France were to reform its labor market to make it as flexible as that in the United States during
this period, then the employment rate would increase by 4.4%. That is, different degrees of flexibility in the
labor market would account for almost 38% of the different employment rates of the US and France in the
late 80’s. The estimated effect means that, going from the bottom to the top of the sample (from Spain to
the US) in terms of flexibility would increase Spanish employment by almost 6.2 percentage points. We
can also do a simple linear calculation to convert these employment gains into income. To see its effect on
French GDP per capita, we note that making French labor markets as flexible as those in America would
mean that total employment would increase by a large 7.6%. The magnitude of the estimated effects is
perhaps surprising (and we will come back to this issue) but we note that the basic evidence is inconsistent
with the predictions of Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and are broadly consistent with the
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) model.
Another way to correct for the lack of independence over time of the error term in each country is
to control for country fixed effects. This method has the considerable advantage of controlling for the
incidence of time-invariant omitted variables that may be correlated with the other explanatory variables.
11
The estimators in regression (2) of Table IA are Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV). The effect
of flexibility on the employment rate has a similar sign and size to that in regression (1) and is significant at
the 5% level, while the coefficient on unemployment benefits is insignificant. This stands in contrast to
Lazear (1990) where the effects of severance pay on the employment rate are insignificant once he
controls for country dummies (Table V, p.714). Regression (3) includes year dummies. Controlling for year
fixed effects adds the requirement that a country with a higher than average flexibility reading one year
must also experience a higher than average (for the countries) employment rate (in order for a significant
coefficient to be obtained). The effect of Flexibility is positive and significant, though of smaller size than
the previous estimates. If France were to increase the flexibility of its labor markets to American levels, its
                                                  
11 Another reason is that we use Hausman’s (1978) specification test to examine if random effects are
appropriate. The test statistic for regression (1), which has a chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom,
has a value of 4.76. The probability of obtaining a value at least as large as 4.76 is consequently 0.0923. Hence
there is some evidence that the assumption of the random effects being uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables is incorrect (or that the model is misspecified). Thus, we also report regressions obtained by
estimation with LSDV.10
employment rate would increase by 1.6 percentage points, now only 14% of the difference in the
employment rates of the two countries.
12 In order to express this employment gain in terms of increases in
French GDP per capita we note that this increases French total employment by 2.8%. There are some
negative effects of unemployment benefits (significant at the 9% level only).
Theoretical models of employment alert us to the possibility that hiring and firing restrictions affect
stock variables (like the employment rate) only through its effects on the flows in and out of employment. It
is possible, then, that Flexibility affects Employment with a lag, and that the lag exceeds one year.
Regression (4) in Table IA indicates that the one-year lag of Flexibility enters positively and significantly in
an employment regression controlling for country and year fixed effects, and is almost 64% larger than the
contemporaneous effect estimated in regression (3). If France were to have US flexibility levels, its
employment rate would increase 2.6 percentage points a year later, or 22% of the actual difference in
employment rates. Using a two-year lag also yields positive and significant estimate of the effect of
flexibility on the employment rate, though the number of observations drops to 102. A virtue of these
estimates is that, if the flexibility data were still suspect of being contaminated by the economic
atmosphere as perceived by the respondents, then this would be less likely to show up with one-year or
two-year lags are used.
13
An even more stringent test for the hypothesis that flexibility affects labor market performance is
to include a lagged dependent variable. Again, from a theoretical perspective, it could be argued that the
long run response of the labor market to flexibility differs in the short and long run, or that there exist
“adjustment costs” that justify this specification. Another reason we could want to include a lagged
dependent variable is that it may help proxy for slower moving omitted variables that are not captured by
the controls included. At any rate, it seems natural to keep an open mind at this stage of our empirical (and
theoretical) knowledge on the subject. Regression (5) in Table IA, estimates the effect of flexibility on
employment controlling for unemployment benefits and lagged employment. The presence of a lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side of (5) introduces a bias. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is to
note that first differencing the data makes the lagged dependent variable correlated with the error term. By
a similar logic, LSDV is also an inconsistent estimator, particularly as the time series dimension of the
panel is short (see Nickell (1981) for estimates of the bias for different T). To correct for this, the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) was used.
Valid instruments are specified in each time period for the first-differenced equations. Regression (5) in
Table IA controls for year fixed effects by including year dummy variables, controls for country fixed effects
by first differencing the data, and then controls for the dynamic panel data bias by instrumenting the
differenced lagged dependent variable (Dyit-1) with lagged levels of dependent variables dated t-2 and
earlier. For details, see Arellano and Bond (1991). The coefficient on Flexibility is still positive and
significant. The size is not too different from that in regression (3). The long run effects are quite large now.
If France were to increase the flexibility of its labor markets to the level of the US, the employment rate
                                                  
12 We can get another sense of the size of this effect by going from the top to the bottom of the sample. Making
the Spanish labor market as flexible as the American means adding another 2.3% to the Spanish employment
rate.11
would increase by 1.5 percentage points. In the long run, the effect would be to increase the employment
rate a full 3.6 percentage points, or 31% of the France-US employment rate gap. The effect of
unemployment benefits is insignificant. Lastly, regression (6) in Table IA includes the more general
specification with lags of the dependent and independent variables. The current level of Flexibility is still
positive and comfortably significant. The first lag of flexibility is positive but insignificant, and
unemployment benefits and its lag enter significantly in the employment regression. We cannot reject
equality of the coefficients (in absolute value) so it seems that there is some evidence that positive
changes in Benefits decrease the employment rate.
Theory leads us to expect different effects of job security provisions across groups, depending on
their roles in the labor market.
14 In the next two tables we study the effect of labor market flexibility on the
employment rates of men and women. The general message of Tables IB and IC is that the estimated
flexibility effects on female employment rate are larger than the corresponding effects in the labor market
for males. The sign and significance of the coefficients in Table IB are almost identical to those in Table IA.
The size of the coefficients is also very similar. In terms of size, however, one of the most interesting
differences is the estimated long run effect of flexibility on employment of females compared to that of
males. Comparison of the estimated effects in regression (5) in Tables IB and IC seems to indicate that the
short run effect of flexibility is larger for women than for men, but that in the long run they have
approximately similar coefficients. If France were to increase the flexibility of its labor markets to levels
comparable to those prevailing in the US, regression (5) in Table IB predicts that there would be an
increase in female employment equal to almost 1 percentage point in the short run, and a 1.6 percentage
point increase in the long run. Regression (5) in Table IC predicts that such a movement would increase
the employment rate of men by over 0.36 of a percentage point in the short run, and almost 1.3 percentage
points in the long run.
We also study the effect of flexibility on labor force participation. Theoretically, we expect there to
be higher participation rates in less regulated markets. The traditional explanation, pointed out by Lazear, is
that more inflexible labor markets mean there is less employment (as Table I seems to indicate). Then, we
would expect that some of the workers who become unemployed drop out of the labor force. Another
mechanism could emphasise insurance effects. If layoffs are discouraged by greater regulation, then wage
income is less risky as there is less probability of losing one’s job. This “insurance” effect may also mean
that more flexible labor markets are associated with higher participation rates, particularly if labor supply
decisions are made at the household level. In Table IIA we explore this hypothesis. Again we present a
parsimonious, reduced form approach showing a number of different specifications. Regression (1) finds
positive and significant effects of flexibility on participation rates. The effect is large: if France turns into the
US in terms of flexibility, the participation rate would increase by 3.5 percentage points, over 36% of the
actual difference in participation rates between the two countries. Again, in contrast to Lazear, the effect
survives the inclusion of country and year dummies, the inclusion of lagged independent variables and the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (estimated with GMM techniques). In some regressions there are
                                                                                                                                                 
13 As we mentioned in section II.b. above, we did not find evidence of such a correlation.
14 For example, Lazear has a short section on the effects of severance pay on the labor market performance of the
young.12
negative effects of unemployment benefits.
The literature suggests some stylised facts about female labor force participation (e.g. it is lower
than that for males and it is larger for single women than for married women; see Killingsworth and
Heckman (1986)). This leads us to expect that the insurance effect would be stronger for females. The
idea, to put it simply, is that there will be higher female labor force participation when men face higher
probabilities of losing their jobs (and higher accessions). Table IIB shows this is largely the case in our
sample, with well defined and positive effects of flexibility on female labor force participation. Table IIC
shows that the effect of flexibility for men is weaker all round. When it is significantly different from zero, it
is substantially smaller in size than female effects.
Table III studies the effects of flexibility on the average number of hours worked per week in
manufacturing. There is some evidence of a positive relationship. To get a feel for the size of the effect,
regression (3) indicates that, if the French were to have American regulations in the labor market, they
would be working 27 more minutes per week, almost 21% of the gap in hours worked per week between
the two countries. There appears to be very little persistence in hours worked (even in LSDV regressions).
We could not find data to study the effects for males and females separately.
Table IVA presents unemployment regressions. Regression (1) finds that countries with more
flexible labor markets have lower unemployment rates in a regression controlling for random effects. The
estimated effects are large. Again taking the relationship to be causal, if France were to reform its labor
market to have the flexibility levels observed in the US, it would have an unemployment rate which was
lower by more than 1.7 percentage points. That is, different flexibility levels would explain almost 47% of
the different unemployment experiences of the two countries during the late 80’s. Regression (2) shows
similar results when controlling for country fixed effects. Importantly, we do not find significant effects of
flexibility on the unemployment rate in regression (3), where we control for both country and year fixed
effects, although the coefficient is still negative. Using robust regression techniques to reduce the influence
of outliers yields a larger, negative coefficient though still insignificant (significant at the 22% level, results
available upon request). As we explained earlier, flexibility may affect labor market flows, and thus could
affect the unemployment rate with a lag. Regression (4) finds that an increase in flexibility today would only
decrease the unemployment rate next year. The effect of flexibility lagged is significant at conventional
levels and its size is almost 10% smaller than that in regression (2). Regressions (5) and (6) in Table IVA
include a lagged dependent variable and only find very weak negative effects of flexibility on
unemployment. In Figure 5, in Appendix 2, we graph the raw data.
A number of economists have predicted adverse effects of inflexible labor markets on the
composition of unemployment (e.g. McCormick (1991)). Table IVB studies long term unemployment.
Regressions (1) and (2) show that countries with more flexible labor markets are associated with a lower
proportion of long term unemployed in the unemployment pool when estimation is by random effects and
LSDV (country dummies only). Given the effects of flexibility in other regressions, the coefficients are
rather small. If the relationship is taken as causal, regression (2) predicts that if France where to reform its
labor market in order to match US flexibility levels, the proportion of long term unemployed would fall 4.6
percentage points, almost 9% of the long term unemployment gap between the two countries. When we
also include year dummies in equation (3) the coefficient on flexibility becomes insignificant (though still13
negative). The lagged specification used in equation (4) finds some evidence of negative effects of
flexibility, significant only at the 7% level. Re-estimation of regression (3) with robust regression techniques
to control for the influence of outliers yields a much higher coefficient on flexibility in absolute value (-
0.191, s.e. 0.072), significant at the 1% level. The same is true when regression (4) is re-estimated with
robust regression techniques, where the negative coefficient on the lag of flexibility is now significant at the
1% level. Regressions (5) and (6) do not find strong contemporaneous effects. There is some evidence of
lagged effects of flexibility on long term unemployment in equation (6) though the number of observations
drops as low as 89.
III. b. Causality and Other Controls
It has been pointed out, however, that unemployment may cause changes in labor market
institutions (Lazear (1990) and Saint Paul (1996) on flexibility and Wright (1986), Atkinson (1990) and Di
Tella and MacCulloch (1995) on unemployment benefits). Thus, there may be a simultaneity bias in the
flexibility coefficient in unemployment regressions. Lack of suitable instruments leads us to focus on timing
to shed at least some light on these issues. If causation runs from say, unemployment to flexibility, we
would expect previous experience with unemployment to predict movements in labor market flexibility. The
fact that we are working with only 7 time periods, however, reduces the usefulness of examining Granger-
causality for individual countries. Thus, we first run a panel regression of DFlexibilityt on unemployment
lagged, employment lagged and participation rate lagged (this is the specification used in Lazear (1990);
see Table IX). None of the coefficients are significant. The same is true if we restrict attention to
unemployment. This is shown in regressions (1) and (2) in Table VA. Comparing regressions (2) and (3) we
can see that flexibility lagged is a somewhat better predictor of the change in unemployment than
unemployment lagged is a predictor for the change in flexibility, though the effect is not strong. It is also
interesting to run separate unemployment and flexibility regressions on unemployment and flexibility
lagged once, and unemployment and flexibility lagged twice. The effects are again more supportive of the
idea that flexibility causes unemployment than the other way around. Thus, the evidence reported in Table
VA, based on the extremely limited data available for this type of exercise, is not supportive of the reverse
causality hypothesis.
Another source of potential concern is that the level of unemployment benefits is the only control
included in our regressions. Although Lazear (1990) runs, essentially, univariate regressions, there is a
literature that studies the role of labor market institutions in shaping unemployment (e.g Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991), Oswald (1996)). Table VB presents regressions where some of the variables identified in
this literature are included as controls. The information is available for only one year when we also have
the flexibility data. Thus, we concentrate on regressions that control for random effects. Regression (1) in
Table VB presents an unemployment regression similar to the first regression in Table IVA with three extra
controls: union coverage, centralisation and home ownership. Union coverage is defined as the percentage
of workers covered by collective agreements. In some countries, like France or Spain, this number can be
significantly larger than union density (source is Appendix 1.4 in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
Centralisation refers to the level at which wage bargains occur (the source is a ranking constructed by
Calmfors and Driffill (1988)). Home Ownership is the percent of households that are owner occupied in
1990 (census data, see Oswald (1996)). The basic result is that the coefficient on Flexibility is still negative,14
comfortably significant and of almost identical size as that in regression (1) in Table IVA. The other
variables also enter the regression with the expected sign and are often significant (the only exception is
unemployment benefits). In terms of comparative size the effect is only moderate. On an average year, it
explains about 19% of the unemployment difference between Spain and the US, which is less than what
the gap in the Union and Centralisation variables between the two countries explain. The rest of Table VB
shows that including these three controls does not change the results we obtained earlier with respect to
employment, participation rates, and the proportion of long term unemployment in the unemployment pool.
The same is true when we study females separately from males (results not reported but available upon
request).
III. c. Other Hypothesis on the Consequences of Labor Market Flexibility
Following the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), there has been growing interest in the
profession on the behaviour of job creation and job destruction. We were unable to obtain comparable
cross country measures of these variables. We did, however, obtain a measure of unfilled vacancies
divided by total employment from the CEP-OECD data set (which in turn collects it from the OECD Main
Economic Indicators), which is as close as we can get to a measure of job creation. And Pascal Marianna
at the OECD kindly provided us with the unpublished data for inflows revised in 1998.
15 In Table VIA and
VIB we study the effect of flexibility on these variables. In spite of some inconsistencies, the results are
interesting. For example, regression (1) in Table VIA shows that the pooled data reveal a very strong
positive association between inflows and flexibility. This is what most economists expect and in Figure 6, in
Appendix 2, we graph the raw inflow and flexibility data. However, estimation by random effects makes the
coefficient insignificant (and negative). In fact, when country dummies are included in regression (3) the
effect of flexibility on inflows is negative and significant. This result does not survive re-estimation with
robust regression techniques nor the inclusion of year dummies.
Regression (5) shows low persistence of inflows and some positive effects of unemployment
benefits. The last 3 regressions in Table VIA control for the state of the business cycle, proxied by the log
of total GDP in the country expressed in constant 1985 prices. As expected there are fewer inflows during
expansions. Regression (7) examines if the evidence supports the hypothesis that the relationship between
the business cycle and inflows is affected by flexibility by including an interaction term (GDP * Flexibility).
The estimated effects have the expected signs though are insignificant (the interaction is only significant at
the 11% level). Regression (8) examines the same hypothesis in the female sub-sample. Interestingly, we
again find evidence that the effect of flexibility is more precisely estimated in the female labor market.
Forcing slightly the interpretation of the variables used, the evidence suggests that recessions lead to more
job destruction in very flexible countries (this is as close as we can get with the data available to testing the
hypothesis that regulation interferes with job destruction). With respect to vacancies, there are again some
inconsistencies. Regression (4) in Table VIB shows that, controlling for both country and time fixed effects,
countries with higher levels of labor market flexibility have less unfilled vacancies.
16 Presumably, this
                                                  
15 We interpolated 4 values of inflows, Netherlands 1984 and 1986 and Finland 1988 and 1990. The results do
not change if these observations are excluded.
16 Normalising by unemployment (instead of employment) produces largely similar results.15
indicates that in flexible labor markets vacancies are filled more quickly. In regression (6) we find that,
somewhat reassuringly, there are more vacancies in a recovery and that there are well-defined negative
effects of flexibility on vacancies. No evidence is found that vacancies increase more in a recovery that
occurs in a country with high flexibility, though the interaction term is positive.
Lastly, in Table VII we examine three other hypotheses that have been proposed in the literature
concerning flexibility of labor markets. The first is the jobless recovery hypothesis, the idea that in more
inflexible labor markets Okun’s law has to be adjusted downwards. Bertola (1990) shows that cross-section
evidence is consistent with this view. In order to examine the evidence on these issues, we present
regressions (1) and (2) in Table VII where the dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Regression
(1) shows the basic relationship between a country’s total GDP and unemployment, once we control for
time and country fixed effects. Regression (2) shows that the interaction term (GDP * Flexibility) is
negative, indicating that when GDP increases unemployment falls more in countries with more flexible
labor markets. The estimated effect, however, is insignificant, although its sign is consistent with Bertola’s
predictions. Stronger effects are found (the interaction term is negative and significant), when the
dependent variable is the female unemployment rate.
17
Second, we test the hypothesis that unemployment persistence is greater in countries with
more inflexible labor markets. This hypothesis has been suggested, in one form or another, by
Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1989). It is also examined in Bertola
(1990) who finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis. To test this proposition, we allow for the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in standard unemployment regressions to vary with the
degree of flexibility. In Table VII, regression (3) includes an interaction term, Unemploymentt-1*(1-
Flexibilityt-1), which is positive and significant at the 2 per cent level.
18 In other words, more
inflexibility (i.e. corresponding to greater values of 1-Flexibilityt-1) is associated with a larger
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Using the coefficients of regression (3), the United
States would have a coefficient on lagged unemployment of 0.596+0.462*(1-0.727)=0.72, ceteris
paribus (mean flexibility over the sample period equals 0.727 in the U.S.). On the other hand, France
would have a coefficient on lagged unemployment of 0.596+0.462*(1-0.423)=0.86, ceteris paribus
(mean flexibility over the sample period equals 0.423 in France). Furthermore, as we move from the
most flexible country in the sample (the U.S.) to the least flexible country (Spain), the coefficient on
lagged unemployment is estimated to rise from 0.72 to 0.92 (=0.596+0.462*(1-0.298), since mean
flexibility over the sample period equals 0.298 in Spain). Regression (4), which is estimated using
GMM, shows a similar effect, with the interaction term again positive and significant at the 2 per cent
level. The effect on the coefficient of lagged unemployment of changing the level of flexibility is now
larger than in regression (3). A decrease in flexibility equivalent to a shift from the U.S. to France is
expected to add 0.25 (=0.820*(0.727-0.423)) onto the size of the coefficient on lagged
unemployment. Thus the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of Blanchard and Summers
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(1986), and Lindbeck and Snower (1989), as there seems to be less unemployment persistence in
flexible labor markets.
Lastly, we examine the basic evidence on the hypothesis that the effect of openness is amplified
in flexible labor markets. The idea is again based on the recent differential performance of the American
and European labor markets. To test this hypothesis at this general level, we repeated the analysis but
included a measure of openness (imports plus exports over GDP) and an interaction term (Open *
Flexibility). The evidence in regressions with country and year dummies is mixed. For a number of different
dependent variables there were no significant effects. For example, the interaction term was insignificant in
unemployment, employment and participation regressions, with the exception of male participation that
seemed to fall with higher flexibility and higher openness but had a positive and significant interaction term.
In the last two regressions in Table VII we present the regressions where the effects seem to be stronger.
Regression (5) is an hours regression. It shows that, controlling for fixed effects, countries with more
flexible labor markets or that are more open to trade, work longer hours. It also shows that the effect of
openness on hours is lower the more flexible is the labor market. Regression (6) is a wage regression
showing that, controlling for fixed effects, countries with higher flexibility and more openness to trade have
lower real wages (average weekly wages in manufacturing adjusted by the consumer price index). The
interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that the effect of openness gets smaller as flexibility
increases. If the effects are taken to be causal, this result could be of interest to economists interested in
reforms. It implies that a country that opens up to trade and makes its labor markets more flexible at the
same time is likely to experience a smaller reduction in real wages than a more cautious country that
decides to only open up to trade. Thus, at least from the workers’ perspective, little could be worse than
doing one thing at a time (sequential reforms).
IV.  Conclusion
One of the biggest challenges in economics today is to explain what causes unemployment.
Economists who study European unemployment often point out that it must be labor market
regulations. This view has been adopted by international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF,
which now insist that countries make their labor markets more flexible when providing them with
financial support. The evidence we have to support this view consists of cross sections, like that of
Bertola (1990) with 10 countries, or the OECD (1994) with 21, and the panel constructed by Lazear
(1990). Because the latter focuses on laws for two aspects of flexibility that change little over time,
this data is almost like another cross section. There is, perhaps, no experience more sobering to an
economist than to review the evidence we have to support policy recommendations on labor market
flexibility and to reflect on the social, economic and personal costs of unemployment.
We introduce a new panel data set on labor market flexibility based on surveys of business people
in 21 OECD countries during 1984-90. One of the virtues of the data is that it originates from people who
have to make their living out of roughly understanding how stringent job security provisions actually are in
                                                                                                                                                 
coefficients because of the bias in short panels with lagged dependent variables.17
their countries. The use of a subjective index allows respondents to capture movements in very different
kinds of regulations that affect the flexibility of labor markets, such as provisions on part time work,
severance payments, interpretation of what constitutes legal cause for termination and so on. These
regulations imply very different costs to normal business operations and would be extremely difficult to
document with hard data. There are, of course, limitations to the data we use. The index is more vague
than what an economist would ideally like to use. By its nature, our flexibility index does not allow us to
distinguish between the effect of the different regulations that are active. And although we present some
time series/cross section validation exercises, the fact must remain that data that are subjective in nature
must be treated with care. However, we believe the relevance of the subject matter and the evidence
available to the profession to be so out of balance that a willingness to experiment with survey data is
justified.
We follow Lazear and use a parsimonious, reduced form approach to study the effect of flexibility
on labor market performance. Our main findings are:
1.  Controlling for country and time fixed effects, and using dynamic panel data techniques developed by
Arellano and Bond (1991), we find that countries with more flexible labor markets have higher
employment rates and higher rates of participation in the labor force. The results on employment are
inconsistent with Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) and are consistent with the
predictions in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). We also find weaker evidence of a positive effect of
flexibility on the number of hours worked per week.
2.  These results are stronger in the female labor market, though the long run effects are approximately
similar across both male and female sub groups.
3.  The estimated employment effects seem to be large. A conservative estimate is as follows: if France
were to increase the flexibility of its labor markets to US levels, the employment rate would increase by
1.6 percentage points, almost 14% of the actual difference in employment rates between the two
countries. In order to see its effect on French GDP per capita we note that this increase in flexibility
would lead to a 2.8% increase in French total employment. Of course, this says nothing about the
convenience of such a reform. For that we would need information on the benefits (in terms of
employment security, wages and so on) of flexibility, a fact sometimes forgotten in policy debates.
4.  The paper only finds some evidence that countries with more flexible labor markets have lower
unemployment rates and a lower proportion of long term unemployed. The problem of the endogeneity
of labor market institutions is addressed but given the unavailability of convincing instruments, must
remain an open issue.
5.  In spite of some inconsistencies, the results on inflows and vacancies are interesting. Controlling for
country and year fixed effects, we do not find evidence of positive effects of flexibility on inflows. We
do find, however, evidence suggesting that recessions are associated with higher inflow rates in more
flexible labor markets (this is as close as we can get with the data available to testing the hypothesis
that regulation interferes with job destruction). This effect is again stronger in the female labor market.
We find some evidence that more flexibility is associated with lower rates of unfilled vacancies.
6.  Lastly, we explore some alternative hypotheses related to flexibility that have been suggested in the18
literature. First, we examine the jobless recovery hypothesis. We find that Okun’s law is steeper in
countries with very flexible labor markets (as suggested in Bertola (1990)), though the effect is
insignificant. We do, however, find evidence consistent with a second hypothesis tested by Bertola and
suggested by Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1989): that the dynamic
structure of unemployment regressions is affected by flexibility. Controlling for country and time fixed
effects, we find that unemployment is less persistent in countries with more flexible labor markets.
Lastly, we do not find evidence that the effect of foreign competition on the labor market is amplified
by flexibility.19
Appendix 1: Sample of 21 countries (with country codes if included in figures 1 and 2)Australia (aus),
Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Canada (can), Denmark (den), Finland (fin), France (fra), Germany (ger),
Ireland (ire), Italy (ita), Japan (jap), Netherlands (net), New Zealand (nz), Norway (nor), Spain (spa),
Sweden (swe), United Kingdom (uk), United States (us).
Greece, Portugal and Switzerland are included in our sample, though not in figures 1 and 2.
Definition of the Variables:
Employment: Total civilian employment divided by the population aged between 15 and 64 years old.
From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Male Employment: Total civilian male employment divided by the population aged between 15 and 64
years old. From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Female Employment: Total civilian female employment divided by the population aged between 15 and 64
years old. From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Participation: Total Civilian employment plus total unemployment divided by the population aged between
15 and 64. From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Male Participation: Total Civilian male employment plus total male unemployment divided by the
population aged between 15 and 64. From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Female Participation: Total Civilian female employment plus total female unemployment divided by the
population aged between 15 and 64. From the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Unemployment: The unemployment rate from OECD Historical Statistics (1991).
Long Term Unemployment: The number of workers who have been out of work for 6 months and more as
a percentage of total unemployment, from the OECD Employment Outlook (1985-1991).
Benefits: The OECD summary measure of the parameters of the UI system. In calculating this measure,
the situation of a representative or average individual is estimated (using the (pre-tax) unemployment
benefit entitlements divided by the corresponding wage). Consequently, the unweighted mean of 18
numbers based on the various combinations of the following scenarios is determined: -3 unemployment





th years of unemployment. -three family and income situations: a single person, a married
person with a dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse in work; and -2 different levels of
previous earnings: average earnings and 2/3 of average earnings (see OECD Jobs Study (1994)).
Flexibility: The survey question that we use (classified as 2.17 LABOUR-COST FLEXIBILITY in 1984)
asked the respondents: "Flexibility of enterprises to adjust job security and compensation standards to
economic realities: 0=none at all, to 100=a great deal". This question was changed in 1990 to "Flexibility of
management to adjust employment levels during difficult periods: 0=low, to 100=high".  From the World
Competitiveness Report, EMF Foundation, Cologny/Geneva.
Inflow: Number of people unemployed less than one month divided by the employed. Updated by the
OECD in 1998. Unpublished.
GDP: The log of total GDP expressed in constant 1985 prices, from the updated CEP-OECD data.
Open: Exports plus imports over GDP, from the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Wages: Index of hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector deflated by the consumer price index, from
the updated CEP-OECD data set.
Hours: Average weekly hours worked in manufacturing sector, from the updated CEP-OECD data set.20
TABLE A: Description of the Data: Averages for 1984-1990
Country Flexibility Benefits Emp. Unemp. LTU
Australia 38.45 0.24 0.66 0.08 0.47
Austria 41.29 0.29 0.64 0.03 --
Belgium 41.83 0.44 0.54 0.11 0.85
Canada 56.90 0.28 0.68 0.09 0.23
Denmark 61.76 0.52 0.76 0.07 0.51
Finland 50.11 0.34 0.73 0.05 0.30
France 42.33 0.36 0.58 0.10 0.65
Germany 41.49 0.28 0.62 0.07 0.65
Ireland 47.57 0.29 0.51 0.16 0.80
Italy 39.87 0.01 0.52 0.11 0.85
Japan 55.43 0.09 0.71 0.03 0.39
Netherlands 46.70 0.53 0.55 0.10 0.67
Norway 40.89 0.38 0.75 0.03 0.19
New Zealand 40.95 0.27 0.67 0.05 0.32
Spain 29.81 0.34 0.45 0.19 0.74
Sweden 40.77 0.28 0.80 0.02 0.22
Switzerland 61.69 0.21 0.75 0.01 --
UK 58.08 0.19 0.67 0.09 0.61
USA 72.66 0.12 0.69 0.06 0.14
Greece 30.28 0.09 0.55 0.08 0.67
Portugal 33.12 0.27 0.65 0.07 0.66
Note: Flexibility is presented as in the WCR, on a 0 to 100 scale. In Table IA onwards,
the data have been scaled down by a factor of 100, to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.21
Appendix 3
TABLE IA

























































Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.19 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.16 0.24
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.22
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.17 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.24 0.21
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.23
TABLE IC
























































Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.17 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.29 0.15
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.24
TABLE IIA

























































Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.19 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.11 0.12
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.25
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.13 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.12 0.08
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.26
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 144 144 144 123 123 102
Adj R
2 0.01 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.34 0.35
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.27
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 137 137 137 116 116 96
Adj R
2 0.33 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.63 0.35
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.28
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 147 147 147 126 126 105
Adj R
2 0.09 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.16 0.08
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.29
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Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 129 129 129 112 108 89
Adj R
2 0.17 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.26 0.18
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.30
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Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Observations 125 126 105 105 105
Adj R
2 -0.09 -0.11 0.25 0.81 0.99
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables. The WCR
Flexibility data have been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale. Unemp abbreviates
the unemployment rate.31
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No. of Observations 140 139 139 130 122
Adj R
2 0.54 0.49 0.43 0.58 0.56
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. All regressions are estimated using random effects (Balestra-
Nerlove). The WCR Flexibility data have been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.32
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No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed
Effects
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 129 129 129 129 108 129 129 129
Adj R
2 0.26 0.12 0.98 0.98 0.49 0.98 0.98 0.99
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.33
TABLE VIB




























































GDP * Flexibility 5.7e-4
(0.002)
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 126 126 126 126 108 126 126
Adj R
2 0.01 0.01 0.66 0.77 0.14 0.77 0.77
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. LSDV is Least Squares with Dummy Variables and GMM is
Generalised Method of Moments. For the GMM regressions, the Sargan test for the validity of the
orthogonality conditions is reported (in italics) in place of the Adj R
2. The WCR Flexibility data have
been scaled down by a factor of 100 to lie on a 0 to 1 scale.34
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Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 147 147 126 105 137 144
Adj R
2 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.06 0.99 0.66
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
 * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, 
** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level. Dependent variable is unemployment for regressions (1)-(4);
average weekly hours worked in manufacturing for regression (5); and real wages in manufacturing in
regression (6). Unemp. abbreviates the unemployment rate. The WCR Flexibility data have been
scaled down by a factor of 100. 1-Flexibility measures labour market inflexibility (on a 0 to1 scale).35
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